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R1-5
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REFRIGERANTS IN ROOM AIR CONDITIONERS
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Calor Gas Ltd, Athena Drive, Tachbrook Park, Warwick, UK.
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ABSTRACT
A number of safety standards and guidelines specify requirements for air-conditioning equipment that use
flammable refrigerants. It is important that safety and technical requirements are based on sound scientific
judgement in terms of the likelihood of potential risks occurring. This paper develops the risk assessment strategy by
considering the following factors in detail, all of which may influence the possibility of ignition risk: mass of
refrigerant, room size, typical ignition sources, leakage from refrigerant systems, failure unit components, building
ventilation rates, build-up and decay of flammable concentrations and servicing. A risk model is developed using
fault tree analysis, which incorporates these parameters to determine their effect on the risk of ignition occurring
after a leak from an installed split type air conditioning system. Results are presented for normal operation as well as
for servicing.
NOMENCLATURE
AC
Af

room volume air changes (s-1)
floor area of room (m2)

C
Ch

mean concentration in air (kg.m-3)
concentration at height hC (kg.m-3)

Ci
h
hC

mean initial concentration (kg.m-3)
installation height of unit, height of release (m)
height of concentration, C h (m)
effective height of the leak (m)

heff
LFL
M
N SOI
t
V&a

∆P
∆t FC
∆t SOI
Φ FV −t

lower flammability limit of refrigerant (kg.m-3)
refrigerant mass charge (kg)
no. of ‘live’ ignition source events per day (-)
time following the development of the
flammable concentration (s)
volume flow of air (m3.s-1)

Φ ign

imposed pressure across building (Pa)
duration of flammable concentration (s)
duration of a ‘live’ ignition source (s)
the frequency of a flammable-volume resulting
from a leak (-)
the probability of ignition (-)

Φ leak
Φ recog

the probability of a leak (-)
proportion untrained who recognise flammable

refrigerant (-)
Φ refuse proportion of untrained who refuse to work (-)
Φ serv
Φ SOI
Φ train

frequency of “competent” servicing (-)
the frequency of a source of ignition in the
environment (-)
proportion trained in handling flammable
refrigerants (-)

INTRODUCTION
The objective of this work is to present a comprehensive risk assessment of the use of flammable refrigerants in
air conditioning equipment, based on two different charge size calculation approaches. The purpose is to establish
whether either of the approaches will contribute to an unacceptably high ignition risk probability. The quantified risk
assessment (QRA) is conducted using a comprehensive risk model developed specifically for this purpose. The risks
relate to indoor ignition only, and for the purposes of this publication, outdoor releases are not evaluated. The two
charge size calculation methods are: (i) unaided dispersion of released refrigerant (Kataoka et al, 2000):
M = 2.5 ⋅ ( LFL)1.25 ⋅ h ⋅ A f

(1)

ii) Dispersion of released refrigerant aided by unit airflow (Colbourne and Butler, 2000):
M = 0.25 ⋅ ( LFL ) ⋅ A f ⋅ 2.2

(2)

The refrigerant mass according to eqn. (2) is only permitted when the air handler provides a minimum airflow,
V&a = M /(225 ⋅ LFL ) . Consequences of ignition have not been accounted for, but are currently being studied as part
of an ongoing investigation. Risk frequencies are calculated according the variety of scenarios, including indoor
units installed at low level (0.6m), medium level (1.2m) and high level (1.8m)m representing floor, window and wall
units respectively. For each situation, both normal operation and servicing situations were evaluated. It was assumed
that fixed equipment would not be put in storage whilst it is charged with refrigerant. Whilst the methodology can be
applied to any refrigerant whose properties are known, the analysis presented here has been limited to R290
(propane)

RISK CALCULATION METHODOLOGY
The general approach to risk assessment in this study is that of fault-tree analysis. Data for ignition sources,
flammable volumes, failure scenarios, etc., have been collated in order to determine their respective frequencies.
These frequencies are evaluated in a fault-tree, providing overall risk for the sceanrio in question. The probability of
ignition is based on three fundamental factors: i) presence of a potential source of ignition, ii) occurrence of a leak,
and iii) flammable-volume resulting from that leak. The probability of ignition is found from the formula (eqn. 3)
Φ ign = Φ SOI ⋅ Φ leak ⋅ Φ Γ

(3)

The frequency of the source of ignition is dependent upon the types of electrical equipment and flameproducing devices within the environment, as well as their location and density within a specific room. Leak
probabilities are generally based on empirical data, with the frequency of a flammable atmosphere being a function
of the size of the leak and other environmental conditions. For each of the calculation methods, the ignition source
frequency, indoor leaks, unit component failure and flammable volume frequency are calculated. Each frequency is
estimated according to the nature of the installation in terms of location and operating mode. The various
components that contribute to the frequencies are listed in Table 1.
Table 1: Components for overall ignition risk frequency calculation
Charge
size
Eqn (1)
Eqn (2)

Ignition source
location
Gen. occupied
space
Kitchen
Office

Activity
Normal operation (on)
Normal operation (off)
Servicing (trained)
Servicing (untrained)

Leak type
Small
Medium
Catastrophic

Failure of unit
components
Fan motors
Airflow/duct
blockage
Control circuit

Flammable volume
source
Small (plume)
Medium (plume)
Catastrophic (plume)
Catastrophic (cloud)

IGNITION SOURCES
Items that could be considered as potential sources of ignition have been identified for each location. Valid
sources of ignition must meet the following criteria: minimum ignition energy: 20mJ and/or minimum surface
temperature: 460°C. The frequency of the ignition source is obtained from the average time an ignition source and
flammable concentration is present per day, divided by the time in one day, eqn. (4).
Φ SOI =

(∆t SOI + ∆t FC ) ⋅ N SOI
86400

(4)

Most ignition sources are assumed ‘live’ for 5 seconds (e.g. light switch, cigarette lighter, etc), but other such as
gas hobs will be continuous for a duration typical of their usage. The local positioning of the ignition source has also
been accounted for, in terms of its height with respect to the height of the unit and the type of release. For example,
a denser-than-air refrigerant release from a floor unit will not be ignited from a wall-switch. Further, ‘small’ and
‘medium’ leak plumes disperse rapidly and are therefore only subject to ignition from the corresponding top, middle
or lowest third of the room height. For most occupied spaces, the number of ignition sources is considered finite in
relation to the room size; a large kitchen will not necessarily have twice as many cookers and kettles within it, as it
doubles in floor area. The exception to this is office space, where the number of ignition sources (e.g. PCs) will
increase proportionally with increasing floor space. It should also be noted that ignition sources within the appliance
itself are not considered because safety standards already ensure they be eliminated.

Due to space limitations, it is not possible to provide an in-depth discussion of the various individual ignition
sources, but those that are considered applicable are listed here. Ignition sources in general occupied spaces: TV
on/off, video on/off, games console on/off, hi-fi on/off, light switches, plug switches, cigarette lighting. In an office
space: PC on/off, light switches, light bulbs (starter), plug switches, cigarette lighting. In a kitchen: gas hob, electric
hob on/off, gas oven, electric oven on/off, cooker extract unit, gas boiler pilot, microwave, refrigerator, kettle on/off,
washing machine, drying machine, light switches. All data is based on UK practice.
Ignition sources for servicing depend on the competency of the technician. If a service person is trained in the
use of flammable refrigerant handling, the probability of him using potential sources of ignition are greatly reduced,
albeit not eliminated. There will also be situations where they must use a source of ignition to carry out the work,
e.g. brazing. To determine what the frequency of ignition sources apply, a typical service pattern has been assumed,
based on the data provided in Goetzler et al (1998). The duration of the visit taken is for 2.5 hours, with a visit
occurring 0.1 times per year. Goetzler also estimates that 15% of service calls require brazing activities. It is
assumed that a trained service engineer will not smoke when handling flammable refrigerants. Potential ignition
sources for a trained technician arise from the brazing torch and torch sparker. For an untrained person they are
additionally those arising recovery machine, vacuum pump, refrigerant detector (electrical), refrigerant detector
(halide) and cigarette lighting. In order to establish the circumstances where trained and untrained service
technicians are likely to work on equipment containing flammable refrigerants, a basic methodology has been
devised. In the UK, it is estimated that 0.9 service technicians have received training for flammable refrigerant, 0.6
of these have a familiarity with them since a large proportion of domestic refrigerators already use R600a. 0.4 of the
untrained technicians are likely to refuse working on the refrigerant due to legal implications. Using eqn. (5), it is
estimated that Φ serv = 0.924 of units will be serviced by ‘competent’ service people and 0.076 will be serviced by
those not considered competent.
Φ serv = Φ trained + (1 − Φ trained ) ⋅ Φ recog ⋅ Φ refuse

(5)

In summary, the frequency of sources of ignition considered here are detailed in Table 2 and are compared
against the values used in other published QRAs for comparative purposes.
Table 2: Estimated ignition source frequencies and comparisons with other QRAs
Location
Kitchen
General occupied space
Office (per m2)
Servicing - trained
- untrained

This study
1.09x10-1
2.49x10-2
1.41x10-4
7.43x10-4
5.23x10-4

HSE, 2000
1.0x10-4 per m2
-

Van Gerwen, 1995
8x10-3, 2x10-3
-

Goetzler, 1998
1.0x10-4
5x10-4 1.5x10-7
1.4x10-5

LEAKAGE DATA
For refrigerant leakage, some useful data has been made available (Ayers, 2000), which provide a good
indication of historical and future leakage values. For one-year period (Nov 1999 – Oct 2000) refrigerant leaks have
been monitored at 410 supermarket installations throughout the UK that range in age from one to ten years. Leakage
quantities, locations and frequencies were measured. The instrumentation took samples every 30 minutes and the
sampling points were located throughout each installation at high-risk positions (15 sampling modules each with
10+ sampling points) so that any refrigerant release from most locations would be observed. The size of the leaks
was categorised as ‘small’, ‘medium’ and ‘catastrophic’ leaks. It should be noted that all measurements apply only
to systems that are operating continuously, since none of these installations completely shut down. Out of the 108
million samples, 1,533,239 leak events were measured; 1,435,473 were ‘small’, 86,882 were ‘medium’ and 10,884
were ‘catastrophic’. 28.1% of the leaks were from components normally located indoors (e.g. expansion device,
evaporator coils, etc) giving an indoor leak frequency of ‘small’ leaks of 3.74x10-3, 0.23x10-3 for ‘medium’ leaks
and 28.1x10-6 for ‘catastrophic’ leaks. Data on installations of various ages has been considered, so the leak
frequencies can be scaled up or down depending upon the age of the equipment considered.
Leakage from equipment in off-cycle
A system during standstill (i.e. compressor switched off) has a lower probability of having a catastrophic
leakage since many of the mechanisms that cause leakage are not present, such as pressure changes, temperature
changes and vibration. A recent report by AEA Technology (Guyoncourt & Fennell, 2000) considered mechanical

and corrosion failure modes, of which very few were found to have the potential to cause a failure that could result
in a gas release within the period required for a catastrophic leak. However, it was found that a combination of
fatigue and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) under severe environmental conditions proceeds to a rapid failure. It
was considered that stresses due to vibration from the compressor and thermal stresses generated during on and off
periods could lead to fatigue failures in badly designed pipe-work or in cases where the tubing or unions have
manufacturing defects. Failures would usually occur during the working period when the vibration stresses are
highest, thus reducing the likelihood of it occurring in off-cycle. However, relaxation of a compressive thermal
stress component after shut-down of the system could expose a pre-existing fatigue crack to a static tensile stress
already present in the copper causing a sudden rupture of the pre-existing fatigue crack.
The pre-requisites for SCC of phosphorous deoxidised copper (refrigeration pipe) are: a corrodent, (particularly
ammonia), presence of water on the surface and tensile stress. Tensile stresses of sufficient magnitude may be
present in the copper and water vapour will condense on the tube surface in the region of the expansion valve and
the evaporator. Ammonia could be generated for example by the bacterial decomposition of urine or other organic
materials. Thus, the probability of a SCC failure can be evaluated. Taking into consideration all the factors
necessary to cause such a failure, a frequency of 1x10-9 has been estimated, which is comparable to the historical
figure of 3.0x10-8 advised by the Liquefied Petroleum Gas Association (LPGA, 2001) on catastrophic leaks from a
LPG storage tank. This is considered to be an analogous situation since it is a static vessel that has a fixed holding
charge and is only subject to minor internal pressure variation according to ambient conditions. Since these vessels
are located outside they are normally subject to more rigorous conditions than those within a human occupied space.
Leakage during servicing
It is probable that the leakage rate in servicing is going to be greater than for normal operation since the service
technician could be intentionally breaking in to the refrigerant containing circuit. With reference to Goetzler, the
leak frequency leading to a significant release during servicing is recommended as 1.0x10-3, which is assumed
“catastrophic”. In addition, the frequency of service calls requiring refrigerant handling is 0.15 to be applied to the
total servicing risk. Taking the proportion of indoor leaks, the respective proportions are calculated. It is assumed
that the probability of small and medium leaks is the same order of difference higher (about 10 times) when
servicing than during normal operation: 2.90x10-2 for ‘small’, 1.79x10-3 for ‘medium’ and 2.18x10-4 for
‘catastrophic’ leaks.
It is also assumed that a leak could occur either whilst the unit is operating (e.g. during charging) or whilst
switched off. On this basis, a 50% probability has been applied to account for the unit operating whilst a leak occurs,
and similarly, a 50% probability of a leak occurring whilst not operating. 0.25 of refrigerant handling activities is
conducted inside since systems are generally recovered and charged from the condensing unit. Also accounted for is
the possibility of a release from a refrigerant cylinder. Experiments from liquid off-take cylinders indicate that
approximately 0.15 kg/s are released when the valve is fully open, whilst it takes approximately 5 seconds for the
service technician to correct this occurrence. This is considered constant regardless of the unit charge size.

FLAMMABLE VOLUMES FROM REFRIGERANT RELEASE
Since reliable data is available on leaks, the flammable volume-time (FV-t) – the duration that a volume of
refrigerant within its flammable range exists for - can be used to determine the frequency that a flammable
concentration will occur. For a particular release scenario, it is essential to be able to define the FV-t, since the
simultaneous occurrence of a flammable cloud with a ‘live’ ignition source will leak to ignition. Each of the three
leak categories described earlier were considered, and the FV-t estimated under according to leak type, mass flow,
location of release, room volume, air movement and ventilation considerations. All releases have been assumed
vapour releases since much of the data is only available for this situation. The method for determining the FV-t of a
release will be different according to the type of the release. The frequency of the flammable concentration, Φ FV −t ,
is found from the total available room volume and the duration of the release (eqn. 6).
Φ FV −t =

FV − t
(31557600 ⋅ Φ leak ) ⋅ A f ⋅ hC

(6)

Flammable volume-time of leak plumes
In the case of a plume, the FV-t of the plume was estimated based on the geometry of the release. Low, medium
and catastrophic leak data was used to estimate nominal release characteristics from a circular hole in pipework

using conventional steady flow equations. The approach described by Cleaver et al (1994) was used to determine the
magnitude of the flammable volumes generated from jets. The FV-t is then calculated from integrating the volume
within the plume that corresponds to the region between the flammable limits of the refrigerant over the total release
time. The FV-t of a plume is generally small, in the order of 0.5 – 1.5 m3.s for a ‘small’ leak and 15 – 35 m3.s for a
‘medium’ leak, of 1kg.
Catastrophic leaks
There are three different situations where a flammable cloud occurs following a catastrophic release: (i) a cloud
from a release of mass according to equation (1); (ii) a release mass according to equation (2) with minimum airflow
in equation (3); (iii) a release mass according to equation (2) with no airflow. Equation (1) was derived on a constant
FV-t basis, so all releases under situation (i) are 900 m3.s. A basic cloud-decay model, validated against data from
previous experiments (Colbourne and Butler, 2000) was used for case (ii), and the output from this corresponded
closely with the results of CFD modelling described by Kataoka et al (2000). For example, a 1kg release from 2m
produced a FV-t of 120m3.s. The approach used to derive equation (1) is used to calculate the initial size of the
flammable volume for case (iii). Eqn. (7) is used to estimate the height of the ‘flammable pool’ following a
catastrophic leak, when C h = LFL .
3

C h ⋅ heff
M r = A f ⋅  C h ⋅ heff −
2

3 ⋅ heff


3
 
 −  C ⋅ h − C h ⋅ hC
  h C
3 ⋅ hC2
 






(7)

The effective leak height, heff , is a function of the floor area and the leak height according to eqn. (8).

(

heff = exp ln (h) − 0.37 ⋅ ln ( A f / 7)

)

(8)

The flammable-volume is the product (hC ⋅ A f ) . Given that infiltration invariably exists, the flammable
volume time is approximated using the decay equation over the flammable volume for the prescribed infiltration
rate. The use of experimental data from an earlier set of experiments (Colbourne and Butler, 2000) was used to
validate the use of eqn. (9).
C (t ) = C i ⋅ exp (− AC ⋅ t )

(9)

The FV-t is therefore the product (hC ⋅ A f ⋅ t ) , where t is the time that LFL ≤ C (t ) ≤ UFL . As an example, for
a 1kg release for a floor unit the FV-t range from 120,000 m3.s for AC = 0.25 h-1, to 4,000m3.s for AC = 5 h-1. A
catastrophic release from a wall unit range from 8,000 m3.s for AC = 0.25 h-1, to 300m3.s for AC = 5 h-1.
Failure of unit components
The use of certain unit components may contribute to an increased FV-t, since their failure may result in a lack
of sufficient airflow in case (iii) above. These are:
•
•

•

Fan motors. Frequency of fan motor failures depends on a wide range of factors including working
environment, type of motor and so on. Generally, precise data is not readily available. Data provided by one
manufacturer states a fan/fan motor failure rate of two in 1000 per year.
Air flow. Filters and air ducts tend to get blocked which reduces airflow rate and therefore the effectiveness of
the airflow. There is no data available to show the proportion of volume flow rate degradation with increased
blocking of filters, which would be a function of time, dependent on the environment that the equipment is
working. However, data has been found in Davies and Pearson (1999) for appliance flue blocking. This gives a
value of 13% of flues blocked per annum, which is considered conservative for air conditioning equipment, but
was employed here in absence of more specific data.
Control circuit. There is no available data on the failure of control circuits, but discussion with engineers
involved in refrigeration controls indicate that a figure of 5% failure per year is reasonable.

Ventilation effect
The effects of ventilation are significant to the creation and dispersion of a flammable concentration of leaked
refrigerant. More-importantly, they contribute to the flammable volume-time of a refrigerant release. On this basis it
is important to determine statistical data on airflow rates for buildings. All buildings have a degree of air leakage,
which equates to an internal airflow through the building, which should be taken into account when evaluating the

presence of flammable clouds and the subsequent dispersion of refrigerant. Statistical data on building leakage at an
imposed pressure is available from certain sources. A collation of leakage data at an imposed pressure of 50 Pa
(Orme et al, 1998) has been used to determine the typical variation in room air changes under a range of conditions.
Within the UK, 3% of buildings have AC = 0-4 h-1 at 50Pa, 29% have AC = 5-9 h-1, 28% have AC = 10-14 h-1,
13% have AC = 15-19 h-1 and 2% have AC = 25-30 h-1. To convert the air change rate due to the imposed pressure
of 50 Pa to an air change rate based on real conditions, eqn. (10) was used.
AC = AC (50) ⋅ (∆P / 50)n

(10)

Where the index n is generally 0.6 – 1.0 depending on the structure, and, ∆P is based on air pressure
calculations for the conditions in question. Using the general approach for calculation of stack and wind-pressure
(BS 5925), the variation in pressure across a building fabric for the range of yearly conditions was evaluated. The
result is the proportion of time that occupancies have a specific air change rate due to natural ventilation. Based on
UK data for a two-storey building in an urban area, the frequencies for infiltration rates - or proportion of time such
air change rates are present – are: 0.086 for 0 ≤ AC ≤ 0.5, 0.225 for 0.5 ≤ AC ≤ 1.0, 0.432 for 1.0 ≤ AC ≤ 2, 0.241
for 2 ≤ AC ≤ 5, 0.016 for 5 ≤ AC ≤ 10. These frequencies were be used in the estimations of FV-t in eqn. (9),
created from catastrophic refrigerant releases as described above.

RESULTS
The results of the calculations for ignition frequencies are presented here. Firstly, it is useful to note the primary
elements of the risk calculation; the sum of which provides the total overall risk. These primary elements are the
ignition risks due to leakage, flammable volume and ignition under the conditions stated. Table 3 lists this data for a
wall unit containing 1kg of R290 in an office space of 48m2 according to eqn. (2), with a 12 hour/day operating
cycle.
Table 3: Example of primary elements of total risk
Element
Small leak plume
Medium leak plume
Catastrophic leak plume
Catastrophic leak, unit on, floor
Catastrophic leak, unit off, floor
Catastrophic leak, unit on, safety controls fail
Catastrophic leak, unit off, safety controls fail
Leak from cylinder
Overall Risk

Servicing
4.50x10-12
1.27x10-10
1.93x10-10
4.52x10-09
4.52x10-09
5.97x10-10
4.52x10-09
4.99x10-09
2.17x10-08

1.E-08
Ignition Risk Frequency (units.yr-1)

In this example, the risks associated
with small and medium sized leaks are
negligible during normal operation. The
effect of the plume resulting from a
catastrophic leak makes a slight
contribution, but the primary cause of
the risk of ignition is the development
of a floor-level flammable cloud when
the unit is operating normally, and when
the unit’s components fail. With the
servicing scenario the situation is
similar, where a catastrophic leak occurs
and the unit is either on, off or off with
the safety controls failed. Thus, the
majority of the factors that contribute to
the overall ignition risk of this
equipment are primarily flammable

Normal operation
4.63x10-14
2.66x10-13
1.99x10-12
4.10x10-11
6.15x10-15
3.17x10-12
3.60x10-15
4.65x10-11

1.E-09

1.E-10

1.E-11
0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

Refrigerant charge amount (kg)
Eqn 1, h=1.8m
Eqn 2, h=1.2m

Eqn 2, h=1.8m
Eqn 1, h=0.6m

Eqn 1, h=1.2m
Eqn 2, h=0.6m

Fig. 1: Results for units installed at different heights

1.2

clouds at floor level and the effects of failure of safety critical controls. The difference in elemental risk is consistent
across the range of charge size and installation scenarios investigated and compared.
Normal operation
The first set of results were generated from the risk model under “normal operation” mode, using refrigerant
charges corresponding to eqn. (1) and (2) for floor areas ranging from 10m2 to 50m2. Figure 1 provides the results
for units installed at heights 0.6m (floor), 1.2m (window) and 1.8m (wall). Since eqn (1) was developed specifically
to maintain a constant FV-t, the ignition risk frequency remains constant regardless of installation height or charge
amount. Conversely, charge sizes based on eqn (2) show a gradual increase with increase in both charge amount and
reduction of installation height. As observed in other work, the flammable volume of a release increases in relation
to room size due to loss of effectiveness in mixing, when the release is unaided. Thus, the increase in risk is due to
the influence of component failure (i.e. loss of forced airflow). A release of a fixed mass from low level also results
in less effective dispersion, again producing a greater FV-t with lower installation heights. However, due to the
influence of aided dispersion when airflow is adequate, the FV-t is significantly reduced, ensuing lower overall risk
than that provided by use of eqn. (1). The constant risk level of eqn. (1) is exceeded for larger ( M >0.8 kg) floorbased units designed to eqn. (2), due to the combination of large charges and poor dispersion when forced airflow
fails. Results in Fig. 1 are for an office space. Ignition within a general occupied space ranges from a similar value
in a large room (50m2) to a ten-fold increase in a smaller room. Similarly, the risk within a kitchen is approximately
three times greater in large areas, increased to around 30 times greater when the room is much smaller. These
differences are approximately proportional to the ignition source frequency within the room in question.
1.E-06
Ignition Risk Frequency (units.yr-1)

Servicing
Generally the rating of the risk
levels according to the design clauses,
follow that of the normal operation
scenario. The exception is that of
equation (2), which indicates a low
risk level for small floor areas rising
to the risk level of the other clauses.
The reason for this is that where the
generation of high concentrations due
to high charge sizes can occur, the
safety system cannot necessarily be
activated

1.E-07

1.E-08

1.E-09

Note about assumptions
Despite the objective of QRA
being to present realistic predictions,
lack of appropriate data necessitated
certain assumptions. Assumed data or
conditions were always worse case, and include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

Refrigerant charge amount (kg)
Eqn 1, h=1.8m
Eqn 2, h=1.2m

Eqn 2, h=1.8m
Eqn 1, h=0.6m

Eqn 1, h=1.2m
Eqn 2, h=0.6m

Figure 2: Results for servicing different units

Leak frequencies were from supermarket installations are higher than small hermetic units.
All catastrophic leaks are assumed 3½ minutes, whilst data shows most occur over a longer period, thus
developing lower concentrations.
Leaks assumed to be vapour only when most are mixed phase, reducing FV-t.
Assumed that infiltration dilutes the leak rather than also mixing which would also reduce FV-t.
Effect of mixing due to thermal convection currents and human movement was neglected.
Although tests show up to 35% of refrigerant is retained in a system after a catastrophic leak, it is neglected.

CONCLUSION
In this study, a methodology for calculating the risks associated with the use of flammable refrigerants in air
conditioning equipment is described and the results of the model are presented, which are based on UK conditions.
In particular, the risk assessment has been used to determine the effect of design and construction of equipment
according to the two approaches detailed as eqn. (1) and eqn. (2). No particular situation resulted in a significantly
higher risk, although the use of eqn. (2) produces an escalation in risk towards higher charge sizes, whereas the risk

when using eqn (1) is constant. This is to the detriment of very low charge sizes relative to the dimensions of the
room. It should be noted that the presented frequencies are based on in-use and servicing modes, and that additional
risks are present during manufacture, installation and decommissioning.
In order to put the calculated risks into context, it is useful to compare them against other measures of
“accepted” risk. Firstly, the UK Health and Safety Executive provide recommended values for risk (HSE, 2000). An
intolerable risk of injury to individuals (not at work) is 1x10-5, and a negligible risk is 1x10-6. Another measure of
risk is that of well-known events. For example, death by lightning strike is 7x10-7, death by a bee sting is 4x10-7 and
death from an aeroplane crash is 1x10-7. In addition, there are existing fire risks from other household appliances.
Based on statistical data on UK fires (Collier and Watson, 1997) the following frequencies are for fires from
appliances in-use: refrigerators - 1.13x10-5; gas cookers - 8.71x10-4; electric cookers - 8.25x10-4; gas central heating
- 4.03x10-5; electric central heating - 1.01x10-4; washing machine - 1.63x10-4; television - 2.65x10-5. The lowest
reported risks are for gas water heating (4.56x10-6) and audio/visual equipment (8.08x10-6). Whilst the fire risk
associated with the audio/visual is probably due to electrical faults, a release of flammable gas is the usual cause of a
fire from a heating appliance. In comparison, the maximum calculated ignition (only) risk for air conditioning
equipment using flammable refrigerants is in the order of 3x10-8 when installed in a small kitchen and 8x10-7 when
being serviced.
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